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Palmer: Mineral Law - Validity of Oil Shale Claims on Public Lands - Mine

CASE NOTE
MINERAL LAW-Validity of Oil Shale Claims on Public Lands-Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920. Union Oil Co., 71 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).

This case is a consolidation of various claims involving
identical or similar facts. Plaintiffs are successors in interest
to locators of unpatented oil shale placer claims.' They applied for patents2 on said claims but the patents-were rejected
by the Manager of the Colorado Land Office, who held that
the claims were null and void as a result of an administrative
adjudication in 1932 which determined that the claims were
invalid for failure to perform annual assessment work. The
Manager took the position that the decisions of the Commissioner in 1932 were conclusive, and that regardless of the
fact that the original cancellations were subsequently held,
by the Supreme Court,8 to be based on erroneous authority
and incorrect, the findings cannot now be challenged. The
Secretary of Interior assumed supervisory jurisdiction because of the importance of the case and assigned the case to
the Solicitor, who upheld the Manager's rejection of the patent
applications.' Held, The doctrine of finality of administrative action and the ability of the Secretary of Interior to give
prospective application only to any change in achninistrative
interpretation of a rule or statute, justifies the determination
that the oil placer claims are invalid in the present litigation.5
1. A deposit of minerals must be located as a lode or placer claim. Generally
speaking, deposits of broken, loose or scattered materials are to be located
as placers. Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, Inc., 6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P.2d 842
(1957). Lode deposits are veins of quartz or other rock in place. Any
deposit not locatable as a lode is a placer. Rev. Stat. §2329, 2331 (1891) 30
U.S.C. § 35 (1964). The oil placers are an exception to the general rule
because Congress specifically provided for location of certain non-metaliferous deposits as placer claims irrespective of the form in which the deposit
occurs. 29 Stat. 526 (1897), 30 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
2. A patent is evidence of the passage of legal title to public lands from the
government to the patentee. Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312 (1898). The
patent is, in the absence of fraud, a final determination and conclusive in
all suits at law if valid on its face when issued. Steel v. Smelting Co.,
106 U.S. 447 (1882).
3. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
4. Union Oil Co., 71 Interior Dec. 169 (1964).
5. The appellants have sought relief in the courts by way of a mandatory
injunction against the Secretary of Interior to force issuance of the patents.
At the present time, this challenge to the Solicitor's ruling has survived
a motion to dismiss in the United States District Court for Colorado. Oil
Shale Corp. v. Udall, 235 F.Supp. 606 (D.C. Colo. 1964). A more recent
administrative decision reversed the cancellation of some of the claims in
contest on the ground that the original claimholders were not properly
served with notice of contest in the administrative adjudications during the
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Between 1915 and 1920 approximately 30,000 oil shale
mining claims were staked under the Petroleum Placer Act
of 1897, the majority of these in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming." These claims virtually covered the known oil shale
deposits but were mainly speculative and consequently little
effort was expended on their development." Under the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920' the right to locate such claims under the
general mining laws was terminated and oil shale deposits
became subject to the leasing provisions of this statute. However, no leases on oil shale deposits were actually granted
under the statute and in 1930 all deposits of oil shale and
lands containing such deposits owned by the United States
were withdrawn by executive order from lease or other disposal subject to valid existing claims.1" This executive order
is still in effect and it appears that the Department of Interior
considers it inadvisable to revoke the withdrawal because of
the large number of outstanding unpatented mining claims
on the oil shale lands."'
Due to the uncertainty of the status of many of these
claims and in order to clarify the situation, the Interior Department has, intermittently over the past 30 years, initiated
contests against many claiiholders alleging lack of discovery,
abandonment or prior adjudication of nullity 2 The issue has

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

early 1930's. However, the Solicitor indicated that before patents are issued
there will be a complete evaluation of all the evidence to determine the
existence on each claim of a discovery within the meaning of the mining
laws as of February 25, 1920. Union Oil Co., Sol. Op. 1965-41.
29 Stat. 526 (1897), 30 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
See Cameron, Current Problems in Oil Shale Development, 10 ROCKY MT.
MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 533 (1965).
See Miller, Impediments to Public Domain Oil Shale Development, 35 U.
Further development was obviously curtailed
CoLo. L. RaV. 171 (1963).
by the discovery of crude oil in large quantities during the 1920's.
41 Stat. 451 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1964).
Exec. Order No. 5327 (1930).
See Miller, supra note 8, at 172.
Many of these claims were never valid while many remain valid today
though unpatented. As the area covered by these claims approximates
4 million acres the value of determining their status is evident. Perhaps
the impetus behind the present activity concerning the validity of the
claims is a revived interest in oil shale as a source of liquid fuels, and the
desire of private industry to develop its potential. Contrary to this position
is a policy of the Interior Department advocating the planned management
of public lands and resources under the control of the Secretary of Interior.
It is contended that this governmental control would enable a balanced and
multiple usage of public lands and best reconcile conflicting interests such
as forest control, wildlife management and recreation. See generally,
Cameron, supra note 7 and Landstrom, Administration of Mineral Patent
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been joined in some instances, as in the principal case, by
rejection of application for patent. As early as 1927 the Department attempted to invalidate some of the claims for failure
to perform annual assessment work but this approach was
thwarted in Wilbur v. Krushnic.'3 This 'decision interpreted
section 37 of the Mineral Leasing Act as prohibiting invalidation of claims for failure to perform assessment work if work
on the claim had been resumed before the action was commenced.1" Relying on the inference that the United States
might divest title before resumption of assessment work, the
Secretary again initiated proceedings against claimholders,
but the Supreme Court in Ickes v. Virginia-ColoradoDev.
Corp. found that any attempt to hold a mining claim invalid
solely for failure to perform assessment work exceeded his
authority under the Act."5
Many of the claimholders failed to appear at the administrative hearings which invalidated their claims and many
failed to appeal the administrative determinations. A few
persisted through the courts and ultimately obtained a reversal of the rulings." The Interior Department has asserted
that the failure of the present litigants' predecessors in interest to preserve their right of appeal from the early adjudications precludes any re-examination concerning the
validity of the claims.17 However, after the Virginia-Colorado
Dev. Corp.18 decision and the Departments' own ruling in
Shale Oil Corp." there was a long-standing and consistent
departmental policy, supported by correspondence from
agency officials, that recognized the validity of the claims
previously declared null and void.2" This long-standing and
consistent policy was suddenly reversed when the present
applications for patent were made in 1962.21
Laws, 9 ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 67 (1964). See also, unpublished
report, The Interim Report of the Oil Shale Advisory Board to the Secretary
of the Interior (February 1, 1965).

13. Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
14. Id. at 317, 318.

15. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
16. Ibid.

17. Union Oil Co., supra note 4.
18. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., supra note 15.

19. Shale Oil Corp., 55 Interior Dec. 287 (1935).
20. Union Oil Co., supra note 4, Appendix C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5 and C-6.
21. Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 235 F.Supp. 606 (D.C. Colo. 1964).
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The position taken by the Secretary of Interior in the
present controversy is that the decision in Shale Oil Corp.,.2
decided in 1935, did not reinstate the oil shale claims invalidated by prior administrative adjudication but only vacated
similar cases being then presently considered by the Department. The cases then in litigation were "recalled" and "vacated" while those previously brought to final determination
The effect of this tautology is
were merely "overruled.""
to a reversal of 'departmental
application
to give prospective
policy. The Secretary has recently been upheld in his authority to limit a change in interpretation of administrative rulings or policy to prospective application. 4 Safarik v. Udall,
however, is distinguishable because competing private interests would have been adversely affected by a retroactive application, while in the principal case the only other competing
interest was the Interior Department.
Another case cited by the Solicitor as tending to sustain
the contention that the Secretary can give prospective application only to a change in interpretation of administrative
rulings is Gabbs Exploration Co.v. Udal.2 5 Appellants in that
case were also successors in interest to claimholders whose
claims had been declared null and void by administrative
action in 1930. This case can also be distinguished in that
the original complaint was based on a charge of abandonment
as well as failure to perform assessment work. The Director
of the Bureau of Land Management affirmed a rejection of
the patent application but indicated that the basis for declaring the claims invalid in 1930 of failure to perform assessment work could not serve as a basis for declaring the claims
null and void. As he did not refute this statement, but relied
on the abandonment issue to support his case, the Secretary
of Interior by implication seemed to recognize that if the
claims had been declared invalid solely on the charge of failure to perform assessment work in 1930, the Department could
22.
23.
24.
25.

Shale Oil Corp., supra note 19.
Union Oil Co., supra note 4.
Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Gabbs Exploration Co. v. Udall, 315 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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not carry the burden in a judicial contest on their present
validity."
It is a general rule that a decision of a court overruling
an earlier decision is retrospective, as well as prospective in
its operation." It is true that, in the administration of the
Mineral Leasing Act the Secretary of Interior exercises a
discretionary rather than a ministerial function,28 and that,
when the Secretary has authority to make decisions which
will place a different construction on the provisions of the
Act from that previously reached by officials of the Department, the decisions may be limited to prospective application.29
However, the executive department cannot exceed the powers
granted to it by the Constitution and Congress, and if it does
exercise a power not granted to it, or attempts to exercise a
power in a manner not authorized by statute, such act is of
no legal effect.8"
Although Davis points out in his work on Administrative
Law that the majority view has supported prospective application of changes in administrative rulings and interpretations because of the detrimental effect a retroactive application might have on private interests who had acted in reliance
on the prior interpretations, the reverse situation exists in
the case under examination.8 A retroactive application to
the original administrative rulings would serve to vindicate
private interests that had refrained from appealing administrative adjudications in reliance on official assurances that
the original cancellations had no effect on the validity of
their claims. It is true that courts have often held that the
doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against the government
but this concept has been subject to considerable erosion in
recent years and the number of holdings in which the government has been estopped has increased. In the Moser case the
26. Gabbs Exploration Co., 67 Interior Dec. 160 (1960). On appeal the court
concluded that the allegation of abandonment in the original administrative
hearing was substantiated by the evidence and within the Secretary's
authority. Gabbs Exploration Co. v. Udall, supra note 25.
27. Jackson v. Harris, 43 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1930).
28. Thor-Westcliffe Dev., Inc. v. Udall, 314 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
29. Safarik v. Udall, eupra note 24.
30. 91 C.J.S. United States § 29 (1955).
31. 1 DAvis, ADMImSiTRATIvE LAw § 5.08, 5.09 (1958).
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Supreme Court held the government estopped and this seems
likely to be the future trend.2
Regardless of whether the terminology used was "overruled" or "vacated," the Secretary of Interior clearly acted
on erroneous authority when he held the claims invalid in
the original contests."' The power of an administrative officer to administer a federal statute is not the power to make
law but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by statute. A regulation
which does not do this is a mere nullity."4 A legislative rule
is valid only if with granted power, issued pursuant to proper
procedure and reasonable."' However, the Interior Department contends that the failure of those claimants who were
properly notified to appear at the initial hearings held to
determine the validity of their claims or to appeal the fina]
adjudications which resulted from the hearings precludes any
further action on the issues determined even though the decisions were based on erroneous authority. 6 The finality of
unappealed judgments in courts of law is ordinarily well
understood, 7 whereas statutory provisions often implicitly
deny finality or fail to make clear whether or when administrative action should be considered binding.88 There is even
some authority that res jifdicata does not apply to administrative decisions.8 Assuming res judicata may be applicable
to administrative adjudications, the Restatement of Judgments takes the position that a final judgment in a court of
law is not conclusive if injustice would result and Davis feels
that the same qualification should apply to any set of rules
concerning application of res judicata to administrative determinations."
While the above lends credence to the belief the Secretary
may be compelled to reverse his decision in the principal case
32. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951). See also 2 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 17.09 (1958).
33. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., supra note 15.
34. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
35. 1 DAVIS, ADMIN STRATrvE LAW § 5.11 (1958).
36. Union Oil Co., supra note 4.
37. RESTATEMENT, JUDGEMENTS § 1 (1942).
38. 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 18.01 (1958).
39. Churchill Tabernacle v. F.C.C., 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
40.

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §

§ 18.03 (1958).

70

(1942).

2 DAvis,
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this does not assure that appellants will prevail in the final

analysis.41 The decision did not consider whether these claims
were abandoned prior to the effort to revive them by new
assessment work nor whether a valuable mineral discovery
had been made on the claims involved.4 2 The decision was
based solely upon the legal conclusion that the question of
validity or invalidity of the mining property was not open
for further consideration. The ultimate judicial decision will
probably be limited to this same legal conclusion and thereby
permit the government, or others who may have an interest,4 8

to prove in future administrative or judicial proceedings that
the mining locations were abandoned or otherwise invalid.
That the Secretary would be within his capacity under the
statute in declaring claims null and void by reason of aban-

donment seems to be settled."
Although an observation in 1955 that oil placers were of

little commercial importance was applicable at that time,"
subsequent technological advances resulting in new methods
of extracting and processing oil shale have encouraged expectations that oil shale will become an economical source
of liquid fuels."' The known reserves of oil shale in the

Piceance Basin of Colorado alone equal that of the estimated
crude oil reserves in the world.4" The fact that approximately
75% of the oil shale deposits are on federal land, and unavailable for acquisition at the present time, illustrates the
41. The plaintiffs position is somewhat improved strategically by a new venue
law which permits claims against the Secretary of Interior to be brought
in the state where the land lies whereas previously such actions could only
be brought in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 76 Stat. 744 (1962),
28 U.S.C. § 139(e) (Supp. U. 1964). The 10th Circuit has been more amendable towards private interests in conflict with the Interior Department.
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied 366 U.S. 936 (1961).
42. As to what constitutes a valid discovery, see 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING
§§ 4.19, 4.28 and 4.44 (1964).
43. Executive Order No. 6016 (1933) authorized the issuance of oil and gas
leases on land withdrawn by Exec. Order No. 5327 (1930). Oil and gas
lessees may initiate proceedings under the Multiple Mineral Development
Act. 68 Stat. 710 (1954), 30 U.S.C. § 521 (1964), which provides that if
a claimant does not file a claim verification within a specified time he loses
all claim to minerals covered by the Mineral Leasing Act and the claim is
invalid as to such minerals.
44. Gabbs Exploration Co. v. Udall, supra note 25.
45. Senior, Oil Placers and Unproductive Mining Claims, 1 ROCKY MT. MINERAL
LAW INSTITUTE 289 (1955).
46. Cameron, eupra note 7.
47. Duncan, Oil Shale Deposits in the United States, The Independent Petroleum
Association of America Monthly, vol. 29, No. 4 (Aug. 1958).
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extreme importance of this case to the development of an oil
shale industry. Of the remaining oil shale land supposedly
in private hands by far the most economic reserves and richer
'deposits are on unpatented mining claims such as are in
dispute here. 8 Even should the appellants prevail in the
present litigation the obstacles to full development will remain as long as title to the claims remain in doubt, assuming
the Department of Interior continues to press for invalidity
on the abandonment or some other theory. The full potential
of the oil shale industry will probably not be reached until
all title questions are resolved on the unpatented placers.
Unfortunately, litigation regarding their validity could drag
on indefinitely due to the large number of claims and complicated fact situations. Perhaps the real solution, and the
only one that holds any hope of fruition in the near future
is legislative and/or executive action to release the vast amount
of withdrawn federal lands containing oil shale to private
leasing on such terms as can be mutually beneficial to private
as well as public interests.4 '
WALTER G. PALMER

48. Cameron, supra note 7.
49. See generally, unpublished report, The Interim Report of the Oil Shale
Advisory Board to the Secretary of the Interior (February 1, 1965).
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